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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
unless it can be said that clipping a coupon or depositing a check
is an administration of property. The conclusion that the court
reached is well substantiated by all previous judicial interpreta-
tions on the subject.
JOHN D. DAGGETT
INDEMNITY-RIGHT OF MASTER AGAINST SERVANT-NECESSITY
OF PRIOR JUDGMENT AGAINST CLAIMANT-A widow brought suit
for $44,265 against the driver whose negligence allegedly caused
her husband's death and against the driver's employer. The trial
in the lower court resulted in a judgment in the widow's favor
against the employer in the amount of twelve thousand dollars.
Before either party appealed, the claim was compromised by
the widow and the employer, the latter paying seven thousand
dollars and both agreeing not to prosecute an appeal. The em-
ployer then sought indemnity from the driver in the amount thus
paid the widow. He stated as his cause of action that he had been
compelled to pay seven thousand dollars in order to be rid of
the judgment for twelve thousand dollars and that the cause of
the judgment being rendered against him was the driver's negli-
gence in causing the death of the widow's husband. On appeal,
the Louisiana Supreme Court sustained the driver's exception
of no cause or right of action. This decision was based primarily
upon the ground that the plaintiff employer had not been com-
pelled by a final judgment to pay any amount to the widow.
Winford v. Bullock, 26 So. (2d) 822 (La. 1946).
A review of the jurisprudence indicates that Louisiana is
among that minority of states which allow contribution between
joint tortfeasors.1 The recent trend toward allowing such con-
tribution has been evidenced in some states by legislative enact-
mentse and in others by judicial action.8 The Louisiana rule,
1. The general rule at common law has long been that there is no right
of action for contribution between joint tortfeasors. Gobble v. Bradford, 226
Ala. 517, 147 So. 619 (1933); Central Georgia Ry. v. Swift & Co., 23 Ga. App.
346, 98 S.E. 256 (1919); Village of Portland v. Citizens' Telephone Co., 206
Mich. 632, 173 N.W. 382 (1919); Brown v. Southern Ry., 111 S.C. 140, 96
S. E. 701 (1918); City of Tacoma v. Bonnell, 65 Wash. 505, 118 Pac. 642, 36
L.R.A. (N.S.) 582 (1911).
2. Ky. Rev. Stat. (1944) § 412.030; Md. Code Ann. (Flack, Supp. 1943)
art. 50, §§ 21-27; Mo. Rev. Stat. (1939) § 3658; New York Civil Practice Act,
§ 211-a; N.C. Code Ann. (Michie, 1935) § 618; Tex. Ann. Rev. Civ. Stat. (Ver-
non, 1935) art. 2212; Va. Code Ann. (Michie, 1942) § 5779; W. Va. Code Ann.
(Michie, 1943) § 5482.
3. Underwriters at Lloyd's of Minneapolis v. Smith, 166 Minn. 388, 208 N.W.
13 (1926); Ellis v. Chicago & N. W. Ry., 167 Wis. 392, 167 N. W. 1048 (1918).
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that, as between parties concurrently negligent, the one who has
paid more than his share of the damages to an injured third per-
son can recover contribution from the others only where a joint
judgment has been rendered against both in the suit by the in-
jured person, was first announced in the leading case of Quatray
v. Wicker.4 There it was stated that the right of action is granted
by the Civil Code 5 in Articles 2324 and 2103. Under Article 2324,
the liability of joint tortfeasors for damages resulting from their
concurrent negligence is a solidary liability. Article 2103 declares
that those who are liable in solido for an indebtedness to a third
party are liable, each for his share of the debt, to each other.
The court in Quatray v. Wicker distinguishes the earlier case
of Sincer v. Widow and Heirs of Bell,O in which contribution was
denied because there had been judgment against only one of the
parties. The rule of the Quatray case was affirmed in a later
case.
7
The principal case, however, is not one for contribution but
one for indemnity. The plaintiff did not contend that the damage
resulted from the concurrent negligence of himself and the de-
fendant. On the contrary, he claimed that it was due solely to
the negligence of the defendant and that his, the plaintiff's, lia-
bility to the widow arose only by virtue of the doctrine of re-
spondeat superior.
In the early case of Brannan, Patterson & Holliday v. Hoel,
the plaintiff had compromised without suit a claim for damages
caused by the negligence of the defendant, its employee. In the
subsequent action for indemnity, full recovery was allowed, the
court saying, "the compromise of the demand of [the injured
party] against the plaintiff cannot prejudice the right of the latter
to recover.""
4. 178 La. 289, 151 So. 208 (1933). It is interesting to observe that under
French law there is no such requirement of a joint judgment. 1 Sourdat,
La Responsabilit6 on FAction en Dommages-Int~r~ts (6th Ed. 1911) n ° 163;
3 Demolombe, Trait6 des Contrats (1875) n* 308; 2 Baudry-Lacantinerie et
Barde, Trait des Obligations (1902) n° 1305; 6 Planiol et Ripert, Trait
Pratique du Droit Civil Francais (1925) n° 687.
5. La. Civil Code of 1870.
6. 47 La. Ann. 1548 (1895).
7. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. DeJean, 185 La. 1074, 171 So. 450 (1936), where
the action failed under circumstances similar to those in Sincer v. Widow
an, Heirs of Bell. See dictum to same effect in Toye Bros. Yellow Cab Co.
v. V-8 Cab Co., 18 So.(2d) 514 (1944).
8. 15 La. Ann. 308 (1860).
9. 15 La. Ann. 308, 309.
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Between Brannan v. Hoel and the principal case, the courts
considered a number of cases for indemnity arising out of tort.
Indemnity was allowed in Costa v. Yochim'0 where an employer
had been compelled by judgment to pay the injured person and
then sued the negligent employee, and in Appalachian Corpora-
tion v. Brooklyn Cooperage Co.," where the plaintiff owner re-
covered from the occupier of premises after paying a judgment
to the injured third person. Analogous factual situations were
presented in Sutton v. Champagne12 and in American Employer's
Insurance Company v. Gulf States Utilities Company, 3 except
that in each of these latter instances the injured party had ob-
tained a joint judgment against both plaintiff and defendant.
Here again indemnity was awarded. Although in each of the
above four cases the plaintiff had been compelled by final judg-.
ment to pay the claim of the third person, in none of them did
the court venture that such a judgment was a condition precedent
to the plaintiff's right of action for indemnity.
In the instant case, the court made no mention of Brannan v.
Hoel, although it is directly in point and reflects the majority
view of other state courts1 4 and of the federal courts. 1 Whatever
may be the merits of holding that a joint judgment in favor of
the injured third person is a prerequisite to a right of action for
contribution between defendants concurrently or jointly negli-
gent, there appears to be no logical reason for the proposition
that a judgment against one only constructively or derivatively
liable for damages is necessary in order for him to seek indemnity
from the actual wrongdoer. Such a judgment in a suit to which
the latter was not a party would not be conclusive as to him,1"
10. 104 La. 170, 28 So. 992 (1900).
11. 151 La. 41, 91 So. 539 (1922).
12. 141 La. 469, 75 So. 209 (1917).
13. 4 So.(2d) 628 (La. App. 1941).
14. Smith v. Foran, 43 Conn. 244, 21 Am. Rep. 647 (1875); Fahey v. Har-
vard, 62 Ill. 28 (1871); Miles v. Southeastern Motor Truck Lines Inc., 295
Ky. 156, 173 S.W.(2d) 990 (1943); Inhabitants of Swansey v. Chace. 82 Mass.
303 (1860); Minneapolis Mill Co. v. Wheeler, 31 Minn. 121, 16 N.W. 698 (1883);
Hanover v. Dewey, 58 N.H. 485 (1878); Frank Martz Coach Co., Inc. v. Hud-
son Bus Transportation Co., Inc., 133 N.J.L. 342, 44 A.(2d) 488 (1945); Button
v. Kinnitz. 88 Hun 35,, 34 N.Y. Supp. 522 (195); Globe Indemnity Co. '.
Schmitt, 142 Ohio St. 595, 53 N.E.(2d) 790 (1944); Aberdeen Constr. Co. v.
City of Aberdeen, 83 Wash. 429, 147 Pac. 2 (1915).
15. George A. Fuller Co. v. Otis Elevator Co., 245 U.S. 489, 38 S.Ct. 180,
62 L.Ed. 422 (1918); Donald v. Guy, 127 Fed. 22A (E.D. Va. 1903).
16. Brannan v. Hoel, 15 La. Ann. 308 (1860).
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and in the action for indemnity he would be entitled to complete
relitigation of all issues."
The court seemed impressed by the fact that no prior judg-
ment had been rendered against the claimant and indicated that
therefore his payment to the widow had been made without com-
pulsion. Whether the compromise settlement was made under le-
gal compulsion or voluntarily is a matter to be decided in the ac-
tion for indemnity. In most jurisdictions it is encumbent upon
the plaintiff to prove that his compromise was fair and reasonable
and that he was legally liable to the injured person,18 but in at
least one state the compromise itself is prima facie evidence of
the fairness of the settlement- and of the liability of the plaintiff
to the payee.19, In either case the question of compulsion is an is-
sue to be litigated and determined on the merits, and the absence
of prior judgment against the plaintiff should not be a bar to
the action.
It is submitted that the decision in Winfqrd v. Bullock finds
no support in the jurisprudence of Louisiana and is a departure
from the general rule of other states and of the federal system.
A. M. Posmu
PRESCRIPTION-CONTINUING ToRT-BURDEN OF APPORTIONMENT-
Plaintiff sued for damages to his land caused by salt water, waste
oil and other refuse which flowed intermittently from the defend-
ant's oil wells for four years. Defendant's plea of one year pre-
scription under Article 3536 was sustained, the court being con-
vinced that a greater portion of the damages occurred long prior
to the period fixed for prescription. The opinion is interesting
because of a dictum statement, the burden of proof rests on
plaintiff to show what part of the damage was sustained after
the period fixed for prescription. Parro v. Fifteen Oil Company,
26 So. (2d) 30 (La. App. 1946).
17. City of Wabasha v. Southworth, 54 Minn. 79, 55 N.W. 818 (1893);
Popkin Bros., Inc. v. Volk's Tire Co., 20 N.J. Misc. 1, 23 A.(2d) 162 (1941);
Globe Indemnity Co. v. Schmitt, 142 Ohio St. 595, 53 N.E.(2d) 790 (19-44);
Aberdeen Constr. Co. v. City of Aberdeen. 83 Wash. 429, 147 Pac. 2 (1915).
18. Smith v.. Foran, 43 Conn. 244. 21 Am. Rep. 647 (1875); Inhabitants of
Swansey v. Chace, 82 Mass. 303 (1860): Frank Martz Coach Co., Inc., v.
Hudson Bus Transportation Co., Inc., 133 N.J.L. 342, 44 A.(2d) 488 (1945);
Globe Indemnity Co. v. Schmitt, 142 Ohio St. 595, 53 N.E.(2d) 790 (1944);
Aberdeen Constr. Co. v. City of Aberdeen, 83 Wash. 429, 147 Pac. 2 (1915).
14 See Miles v. Southeastern Motor Truck Lines, Inc., 295 Ky. 156, 173
S.W.(2d) 990 (1943).
1. Art. 3538, La. Civil Code of 1870.
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